Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) have become the most successful application of our time. Nearly two billion persons 1 regularly use some OSN to interact with friends and relatives, share information, get news, entertainment, etc. As a result of this, massive to re-identify the victims.
The notion of (k, ℓ)-anonymity was introduced in [11] as a measure of the resistance of a social graph to active attacks. Informally, a (k, ℓ)-anonymous graph ensures that an adversary with the ability to insert up to ℓ sybil nodes in the network, cannot use the distances from these sybil nodes to other vertices to uniquely identify any vertex. This guarantee comes from the fact that each vertex is ensured to be undistinguishable from at least other k − 1 vertices according to the so-called metric representation with respect to every vertex subset of size at most ℓ. Then, a family of methods that transform a (1, 1)-anonymous graph G (which is the least private type of graphs) into a graph G ′ that satsifies (k, ℓ)-anonymity for k > 1 or ℓ > 1, was proposed in [5, 4] . In this paper, we re-visit the notion of (k, ℓ)-anonymity. We focus on two assumptions encoded in (k, ℓ)-anonymity: treating every vertex subset of size up to ℓ as a potential set of sybil nodes, and assuming that the adversary is able to control the distances between the set of sybil nodes and every other vertex in the graph, which is not realistic. As a result, we first propose the notion of (k, ℓ)-anonymous transformations, which ensure the same level of protection that would be achieved by enforcing (k, ℓ)-anonymity while performing less modifications in the graph. Then, we introduce a new privacy property, (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity, which relaxes the assumption on the distances that the adversary is able to control. Finally, these two ideas are combined in the notion of (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformation, and we propose two methods, based on edge additions and removals, for performing (k, 1)-and (2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our new adversary model, introducing (k, ℓ)-anonymous transformations, (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity, and (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations. Section 3 introduces the algorithm for obtaining (k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transformations, whereas Section 4 introduces the algorithm for obtaining (2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations. Finally, we discuss our results and possible directions for future work in Section 5. Before proceeding, we will introduce some notation that will be used throughout the paper. We will use the notation u ∼ G v for two vertices u, v ∈ V (G) that are adjacent in G, i.e. (u, v) ∈ E(G). The open neighbourhood of a vertex u ∈ V (G), denoted by N G (u), is the set N G (u) = {v : u ∼ G v}, whereas the closed neighbourhood of u in G is the set N G [u] = {u}∪N G (u). Similarly, for a set S ⊂ V (G), we define N G (S) = ∪ v∈S N G (v) \ S and N G [S] = ∪ v∈S N G [v] . The degree of a vertex u, denoted by δ G (u), is its number of neighbours, i.e. δ G (u) = |N G (u)|. In a graph G of order n, we will refer to vertices of degree 0, 1 and n − 1 as isolated, end-and dominant vertices, respectively. The distance between two vertices u and v in G, denoted as d G (u, v) , is the number of edges in a shortest path joining u and v. For a graph G = (V, E) and a subset S of vertices of G, we will denote by S G the subgraph of G induced by S, that is S G = (S, E ∩ S × S). In the previously defined notations, if there is no ambiguity, we will drop the graph-specific subindices and simply write u ∼ v, N(u), δ(u), etc. For a graph G, we define δ(G) = min v∈V (G) {δ G (v)} and ∆(G) = max v∈V (G) {δ G (v)} and, as usual, we will denote by K n and N n the complete and empty graphs of order n, respectively. Sybil nodes added and links to the victims (H and G) established (a) Active attack prior publication. 
Graph after anonymisation

Adversary model
An active adversary uses graph properties of a set of sybil nodes to re-identify users in an anonymised social graph. Prior publication of the social network graph, the active attacker adds a set of sybil nodes to the network (e.g. nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Figure 1a ). The sybil nodes establish links between themselves and also with the victims (e.g. users H and G in Figure 1a ). After publication of the social network graph without the users' identifiers, the attacker first searches for the subgraph formed by the sybil nodes. Victims connected to the attacker subgraph can be reidentified by using the neighbour relation between sybil nodes and victims. For example, the non-sybil nodes connected to 1 and 4 in Figure 1b , respectively, must be H and G. This allows the adversary to acquire knowledge that was supposed to remain private, such as the existence of a link between users H and G.
From a practical point of view, active attacks require the ability to insert sybil nodes in the social network and remain unnoticed by sybil detection techniques. This is a fairly easy task in today's social networks, as false positives in sybil detection are undesirable and registration to the network should be trivial; social networks understandably favour usability and user experience over sybil detection. From a theoretical point of view, an active attack relies on creating a unique attacker sub-graph. That is to say, the induced subgraph formed by the sybil nodes should have no trivial automorphism and no other subgraph in the network isomorphic to it. For example, assume that the adversary in the attack in Figure 1 could not insert the third node, i.e. the node labelled 3. This makes the subgraph induced by 1, 2 and 4 isomorphic to the subgraph induced by B, C, and H, which prevents the attacker from correctly retrieving the inserted subgraph.
Backstrom et al. already showed that, despite of the previously mentioned challenges, active attacks can be implemented successfully [1] . They proved that only log n sybil nodes, where n is the number of vertices of the network, are needed to create an attacker subgraph which is unique with high probability. That makes active attacks particularly dangerous and hard to prevent.
Effectively determining whether a social graph is vulnerable to an active attack is a necessary step towards developing a mitigation strategy against it. For example, the complete graph G satisfies that for every proper subgraph S there exists another subgraph S ′ that is isomorphic to S. Such property makes an active attack unfeasible in a complete graph. Determining the actual resistance of an arbitrary graph to active attacks is not trivial, though. A first step on this direction was given in [11] , where Trujillo-Rasua and Yero introduced the privacy measure (k, ℓ)-anonymity.
Consider a total order on the vertices of a graph G. Given a set S ⊆ V (G), let (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v t ), where v i ∈ S for i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, be the vector composed by the elements of S, in such a way that v 1 v 2 . . . v t . For the sake of simplicity in our presentation, in what follows we will abuse notation and refer to the ordered set S = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v t }. Given an ordered set of sybil nodes S = (s 1 , . . . , s t ) in a graph G = (V, E), Trujillo-Rasua and Yero [11] define the adversary knowledge about a user u ∈ V as the vector (d G (v, s 1 ) , . . . , d G (v, s t )). This vector is referred to as metric representation of u with respect to S, and denoted r G (u|S) [10, 2] .
The metric representation was introduced in [10, 2] as a tool to define the socalled resolving sets. A set S ⊂ V (G) is said to be a resolving set 2 of G if every vertex u ∈ V (G) has a unique metric representation with respect to S. This property of resolving sets inspired the definition in [11] of an opposed concept, with implications in vertex privacy.
Definition 1 (k-antiresolving set). Let G = (V, E) be a non-trivial graph. A set S ⊂ V is a k-antiresolving set of G if k is the largest positive integer such that, for every v ∈ V (G) \ S, there exist vertices w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w k−1 ∈ V (G) \ S such that v, w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w k−1 are pairwise different and
The minimum cardinality of a k-antiresolving set of a graph G is called the kmetric antidimension of G. These concepts were used to quantify the privacy of a social graph in the presence of active attackers as follows. Definition 2 ((k, ℓ)-anonymity) . A graph G is said to satisfy (k, ℓ)-anonymity if k is the smallest positive integer such that the k-metric antidimension of G is smaller than or equal to ℓ.
From a privacy perspective, if a graph satisfies (k, ℓ)-anonymity, an attacker with the capacity to enrol, and successfully retrieve, up to ℓ sybil nodes in the graph would still be incapable of distinguishing any vertex from at least other k−1 vertices. Taking back again the example of the complete graph K n , it is easy to prove that K n satisfies (n − l, l)-anonymity. It is worth noticing that k = n − l corresponds to the maximum value possible for k in (k, ℓ)-anonymity given ℓ = l.
Certainly, a graph satisfying (k, ℓ)-anonymity for k > 1 effectively resists active attacks when performed by at most ℓ sybil nodes. However, event the simplest of the privacy goals, namely transforming a (1, 1)-anonymous graph into a (k, ℓ)-anonymous graph G ′ with either k > 1 or ℓ > 1, has not been accomplished without significant information loss [5] . Our observation is that (k, ℓ)-anonymity, although suitable to quantify resistance against active attacks, cannot be applied straightforwardly to privacy-preserving transformation of social graphs.
Revisiting (k, ℓ)-anonymity
(k, ℓ)-anonymity quantifies over all subsets of vertices of size at most ℓ. Therefore, a transformation from an original graph G to an anonymized graph G ′ satisfying, for example (2, ℓ)-anonymity, must ensure that every subset of vertices S in G ′ with |S| ≤ ℓ is a k ′ -antiresolving set where k ′ ≥ 2, regardless of whether S was indeed a 1-antiresolving set in G or not. In effect, assuming that the set of attacker nodes S is already a 2-antiresolving set in the original graph G, it is harmless to publish (with respect to (2, |S|)-anonymity ) a transformation of G where S is a 1-antiresolving set. Consequently, when aiming at (2, ℓ)-anonymity, a transformation method should only be concerned about those 1-antiresolving sets with size at most ℓ. We formalise this concept as follows.
Notice that, in particular, if a graph G satisfies (k, ℓ)-anonymity, then every pair (G 0 , G), where G 0 is an arbitrary graph, is a (k, ℓ)-anonymous transformation. The converse is not true, as exemplified in Figure 2 .
The adversary knowledge
Privacy measures based on k-anonymity are defined based on a concrete definition of the adversary knowledge. In (k, ℓ)-anonymity, an adversary is a set of sybil nodes S ⊆ V (G) within a network G. The knowledge of such adversary about a user u ∈ V (G) − S is considered to be the metric representation r G (u|S). That is to say,
the adversary is capable of determining the distance from every attacker node to any other node in the network. This is a strong assumption, yet it can be justified by the necessity of not underestimating the adversary capabilities.
In this article we relax the assumption on the adversary knowledge made in [11] . Our decision is based on the fact that all active attacks proposed so far [1, 7, 8] rely on the neighbour relation between the attacker nodes and the victims. It is indeed unrealistic to expect the adversary to rely on arbitrary distances, since that would imply knowing the entire adjacency matrix and, especially, having the capability to influence whether a relation is established, or not, between any pair of users of the network.
In a manner analogous to the definition of antiresolving sets, we use standard concepts from Graph theory to represent an adversary that only has knowledge about its neighbours. The concept is known as adjacency representation, introduced by Jannesari and Omoomi [3] and defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Adjacency representation).
Given a graph G = (V, E), an ordered set S = {s 1 , . . . , s t } ⊂ V , and a vertex u ∈ V , the adjacency metric representation of u with respect S is the vector
. Now, we will adapt the notion of k-antiresolving sets in order to account for the new type of adversary.
Definition 5 (k-adjacency antiresolving set). Let G = (V, E) be a non-trivial graph. A set S ⊂ V is a k-adjacency antiresolving set of G if k is the largest positive integer such that, for every v ∈ V (G) \ S, there exist vertices w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w k−1 such that v, w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w k−1 are pairwise different and
To illustrate the difference between k-adjacency antiresolving sets and k-antiresolving sets, consider the graph G depicted in Figure 3 . The set {v} is a 2-antiresolving set of G, as z 1 and
, so {v} is a 4-adjacency antiresolving set of G. Figure 3 : In this graph, the set {v} is a 2-antiresolving set and a 4-adjacency antiresolving set.
For a graph G = (V, E) and a set S ⊂ V , let R G,S be the equivalence relation such that two vertices u and v satisfy u R G,S v if and only if u, v ∈ V \ S and a G (u | S) = a G (v | S). Moreover, we will use the notation A G,S for the set of equivalence classes induced in V \ S by the relation R G,S . It is simple to see that S is a (min A∈A G,S {|A|})-adjacency antiresolving set of G.
Problem statement
We will first enunciate the notions of (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity and (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformation, which restrict the original definitions of (k, ℓ)-anonymity and (k, ℓ)-anonymous transformation, to account for adversaries whose knowledge consists of the adjacency representations of their victims.
Definition 6 (k-adjacency antidimension). The k-adjacency antidimension of a graph G is the minimum cardinality of a k-adjacency antiresolving set of G.
Definition 7 ((k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity). A graph G satisfies (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity if k is the smallest positive integer such that the k-adjacency antidimension of G is smaller than or equal to ℓ.
According to Definition 7, if a graph G satisfies (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity, then for every S ⊂ V (G) of size at most ℓ and every
, so the probability of S being able to re-identify v is at most 1/k.
It is simple to see that the complete graph K n and the empty graph N n = (V, ∅) satisfy (n − ℓ, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity for every ℓ ∈ {1, n − 1}, because for every S ⊂ V the adjacency representation of every other vertex with respect to S is either (1, 1, . . . , 1) or (2, 2, . . . , 2), respectively. In the next sections we will introduce results characterising the graphs that satisfy (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity for other values of k and ℓ.
with |S| ≤ ℓ, S being a k 1 -adjacency antiresolving set in G 1 , and S being k 2 -adjacency antiresolving set in G 2 , it holds that
In a manner analogous to (k, ℓ)-anonymous transformations, we have that if a graph G satisfies (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity, then every pair (G 0 , G), where G 0 is an arbitrary graph, is a (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformation.
Definition 9 (Problem statement). Let loss(G, G ′ ) be a cost function providing the information loss incurred by the graph transformation from G to G ′ . Given a graph G, and natural numbers k and ℓ, find G ′ such that (G, G ′ ) is a (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformation and loss(G, G ′ ) is minimum.
(k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transformations
Consider a (k 0 , 1)-adjacency anonymous graph G of order n. In order to increase the resistance of G to active attackers leveraging one sybil node, our interest is to propose (k, 1)-adjacency transformations of the form (G, G ′ ) where k > k 0 . The next result allows us to assess the values of k that may be of interest. . Let v ∈ V be a vertex of G satisfying δ(v) / ∈ {0, n − 1}. The existence of such a vertex is guaranteed by the fact that the graph is not complete nor empty. We have that
, then {v} is a k ′ -adjacency antiresolving set of G with k ′ < k, which is a contradiction. On the other hand,
, which again means that {v} is a k ′ -adjacency antiresolving set of G with k ′ < k, a contradiction. Therefore, we have that k ≤ n−1 2 .
According to Proposition 10, in order to enforce (k, 1)-adjacency anonymity on G for some k > n− 1 2 , it is necessary to transform G into a complete or empty graph, which lacks interest for us because such a graph would be completely useless for analysis. Thus, we will focus on the values of k in the interval k 0 + 1,
. The following results show the relations between the minimum and maximum degrees of a graph and its resistance against active attackers leveraging one sybil node. We first introduce some additional notation. For a graph G = (V, E), let I G = {v ∈ V : δ(v) = 0} be the set of isolated vertices and let D G = {v ∈ V : δ(v) = n − 1} be the set of dominant vertices. Clearly, either
Proposition 12. Let G = (V, E) be a non-complete graph of order n such that D G = ∅ and let S = V \ D G . Then, G satisfies (k, 1)-adjacency anonymity with
Proof. We follow a reasoning analogous to that of the proof of Proposition 11. First, consider a vertex v ∈ D G . We have that A G,{v} = {V \ {v}}. Now, consider a vertex v ∈ S. In this case,
In consequence, we have that G satisfies (k, 1)-adjacency anonymity with
Proposition 13. Let G = (V, E) be a non-empty graph of order n such that I G = ∅ and let S = V \ I G . Then, G satisfies (k, 1)-adjacency anonymity with
Proof. We follow a reasoning analogous to that of the proofs of Propositions 11 and 12. First, consider a vertex v ∈ I G . We have that A G,{v} = {V \ {v}}. Now, consider a vertex v ∈ S. In this case,
According to Propositions 11, 12 and 13, in order to enforce (k, 1)-adjacency anonymity on a graph G, it is necessary to transform it into a graph G ′ such that the induced subgraph
has minimum degree greater than or equal to k and maximum degree smaller than or equal to n − k − 1, where n is the order of G ′ . Likewise, in order to obtain a (k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transformation
Based on these facts, we propose an algorithm that, given a (k 0 , 1)-adjacency anonymous graph G = (V, E) and an integer k such that
is a (k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transformation. The method works by performing a series of edge additions and removals upon G, as outlined in Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, the sets L and H contain the vertices whose degrees are, respectively, smaller and greater than required for the privacy requirement to be satisfied (without being isolated nor dominant vertices). Steps 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30 and 33 can be efficiently performed by maintaining the elements of V sorted by their degree and updating the ordering when necessary. The rationale behind the loop in steps 4 to 18 is to first add as many edges as possible between pairs of vertices from L, since every addition of this type increases the degree of two of such vertices. When such additions are no longer possible, then we add edges linking a vertex u ∈ L and a vertex v / ∈ L whose degree is as small as possible. The latter condition makes that the degree of vertices from H is only increased if there is no vertex in V \ H to which u can be linked. An analogous idea is applied in the loop in steps 20 to 34 to first remove edges joining pairs of vertices from H, then edges joining a vertex from H to other vertex (with the particularity that step 29 takes care Algorithm 1 Given a (k 0 , 1)-adjacency anonymous graph G = (V, E) and an integer k ∈ k 0 + 1,
if X = ∅ then 7:
v ← arg max y∈Y {δ G ′ (y)} 10:
else 12:
v ← arg min y∈Y {δ G ′ (y)} 15:
end if
if X = ∅ then 23:
v ← arg min y∈Y {δ G ′ (y)} 26:
else 28:
v ← arg max y∈Y {δ G ′ (y)} 31:
end if 33:
of not making the degree of a vertex from L decrease again), and so on. It is worth noting that in real-life social graphs, which are characterised by very low densities, and for practical values of k, steps 20 to 34 are very unlikely to be executed.
Considering the number of modifications performed by the algorithm, the best scenario is when all edge additions are done according to steps 5 to 10, and all edge removals are done according to steps 21 to 26, as shown in the following results.
Theorem 14. Let G = (V, E) be a (k 0 , 1)-adjacency anonymous social graph and let k ∈ k 0 + 1,
. The number t of edges added by steps 4 to 18 of Algorithm 1 satisfies 
. . , t}, be the sequence of edges added to G by steps 4 to 18 of Algorithm 1. Let E 0 = E and
. . , t}. Moreover, for every i ∈ {0, . . . , t}, let
After adding the edge (u i , v i ), we have that
We define the function
which specifies by how much the sum of the degrees of vertices from L needs to be increased for (G, G i ) to be a (k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transformation. Note that, by the definition of t, we have that missing(G t ) = 0. Moreover, missing(G 0 ) =
After adding the edge (u i , v i ), the following situations are possible:
In this case, since two vertices from L i−1 have their degree increased by 1, we have that missing(
With the previous definitions in mind, we will address the proof of the left-hand inequality in Equation 2 . To that end, we will assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that
If missing(G 0 ) is even, we have that t < missing(G 0 ) 2
. Given that, in the best case scenario, situation 1 above occurs at every iteration of the algorithm, we have
which is a contradiction. In a similar manner, if missing(G 0 ) is odd, we have that t <
. Here, in the best case scenario, situation 1 above occurs in every iteration, except one, so
which is also a contradiction. Thus, we can conclude that
The right-hand inequality in Equation 2 is trivial, given that at least one vertex has its degree increased by 1 at every iteration. The proof is thus complete.
The lower and upper bounds provided in Theorem 14 are tight, as exemplified in Theorem 15. Let G = (V, E) be a (k 0 , 1)-adjacency anonymous social graph and let k ∈ k 0 + 1,
. Let G t be the graph obtained from G after executing steps 4 to 18 of Algorithm 1. The number t ′ of edges removed by steps 20 to 34 of Algorithm 1 satisfies
and
Proof. We will follow a reasoning analogous to the one applied in the proof of Theorem 14. Let ((
, . . . , t ′ }, be the sequence of edges removed from G t by steps 20 to 34 of Algorithm 1.
After removing the edge (u i , v i ), we have that
Now we introduce the function
In a manner analogous to the proof of Theorem 14, we have that by definition excess(G t+t ′ ) = 0 and excess(G t ) =
Additionally, after removing the edge (u i , v i ), the following situations are possible:
In this case, since two vertices from H i−1 have their degree decreased by 1, we have that
Now, to address the proof of the inequality in Equation 3, we assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that
In consequence, if excess(G t ) is even, we have
which is a contradiction, whereas in the case that excess(G t ) is odd we have
which is also a contradiction, so we can conclude that Equation 3 holds. As in Theorem 14, the upper bound (Equation 4) is trivial.
(2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations
In Algorithm 1, the fact that a vertex v satisfies v ∈ L means that the equivalence class composed by the vertices having adjacency representation (1) with respect to the set {v} in the original graph G is not empty and its cardinality is smaller than k. Likewise, the fact that v ∈ H means that the equivalence class composed by the vertices having adjacency representation (2) with respect to the set {v} in G is not empty and its cardinality is smaller than k. To a limited extent, a strategy similar to the one applied in Algorithm 1 can be used to obtain (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations with ℓ > 1. For example, for ℓ = 2, in addition to the sets L, H ⊂ V (G), we would consider the sets P 11 , P 12 , P 21 , P 22 ⊆ V (G) × V (G), where (u, v) ∈ P ij , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, means that the the equivalence class composed by the vertices having adjacency representation (i, j) with respect to (u, v) in G is not empty and its cardinality is smaller than k. Thus, the algorithm would work by executing the necessary edge set editions to increase the cardinalities of these equivalence classes or, alternatively, to empty them. However, it is impractical to use this philosophy in the general case, as it entails designing a different, highly casuistic algorithm for every different value of ℓ.
For the general case, we have devised a greedy edge-addition-based method that, for small values of ℓ, allows to obtain (2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations. Given a graph G = (V, E), the method starts by computing all 1-adjacency antiresolving sets of G of cardinality at most ℓ. Then, edges are iteratively added until obtaining a graph
is a (2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformation. The critical aspect of the proposed framework is how to determine an appropriate order for adding edges.
In order to describe the proposed method, we will first introduce the following results, which characterise the sets of edges whose addition to a graph G may modify the set of 1-adjacency antiresolving sets. In what follows, we will use the notation S G,ℓ for the set of 1-adjacency antiresolving sets of a graph G having cardinality smaller than or equal to ℓ.
Remark 16. Let G = (V, E) be a social graph, u, v ∈ V a pair of vertices of G such that (u, v) / ∈ E, and
Proof. The result follows directly from the fact that, for every S ∈ S G,ℓ and every
Algorithm 2 describes the edge-addition method. First, we use Remark 16 to discard candidate vertex pairs (u, v) that are known not to cause any 1-adjacency antiresolving set of the current graph G = (V, E) to become a k-adjacency antiresolving set of G ′ = (V, E ∪ {(u, v)}) with k > 1. Then, every remaining candidate pair (u, v) is scored as follows:
where [v] G S represents the equivalence class of v in A G,S . In other words, we consider the number of times the candidate pair would modify the fingerprint of a uniquely identifiable vertex with respect to a 1-adjacency antiresolving set of G. The intuition behind this heuristics is that the larger the number of times that the pair (u, v) is found in this situation, the larger the likelihood that adding the edge (u, v) will result in making some vertex set stop being 1-adjacency antiresolving. At every iteration, the current perturbed graph
, where (u, v) is the best-scored candidate addition satisfying
Algorithm 2 Given a graph G = (V, E) and a positive integer ℓ ≥ 2, obtain a graph
for S ∈ S G,ℓ do
end if 10:
end for 11: end for 12: Decrementally sort C by score((u, v)) = |{S :
t ← t + 1 20: end while 21: return G t
The asymptotic time complexity of Algorithm 2 is dominated by the computation and traversals of S G,ℓ , which is O(2 n ) in the general case. However, for small values of ℓ, these computations can be done in O(n ℓ ) time. As we discussed before, active adversaries can only insert a limited amount of sybil nodes in the network without being detected, so the capacity of protecting the graph against such adversaries results in an important privacy increase. As an aid to speed-up the algorithm, the following result shows how the number of verifications to perform in evaluating the condition at step 16 can be largely reduced.
Theorem 17. Let G = (V, E) be a social graph, u, v ∈ V a pair of vertices of G such that (u, v) / ∈ E, and G ′ = (V, E ∪ {(u, v)}). Let S ⊆ V such that it is a k-adjacency antiresolving set of G, with k ≥ 2, and a 1-adjacency antiresolving set of
Proof. Consider a graph G = (V, E), a pair of vertices u, v ∈ V such that (u, v) / ∈ E and a set S ⊆ V satisfying the premises of Theorem 17. Also consider a vertex w ∈ S such that d G (u, w) > 2 and d G (v, w) > 2 and a vertex x ∈ V \S such that [x]
By the definition of S we have that |[x] G S | > 1, so there exists y ∈ V \ (S ∪ {x}) such that a G (x| S) = a G (y| S) and a G ′ (x| S) = a G ′ (y| S). Suppose, for the purpose of contradiction, that a G ′ (w, x) = a G ′ (w, y). Then, since w = u and w = v, we have that a G (w, x) = a G (w, y), which contradicts the fact that a G (x| S) = a G (y| S). Therefore, we have that a G ′ (w, x) = a G ′ (w, y), which implies that a G (x| S \{w}) = a G (y| S \{w}) and a G ′ (x| S \ {w}) = a G ′ (y| S \ {w}). Since the only difference between G and G ′ is the addition of the edge (u, v), we conclude that either x = u and v ∈ S, or vice versa. For the remainder of this proof, we will assume x = u and v ∈ S without loss of generality.
We will now proceed by reduction to absurdity. To that end, we will assume that G ′ S = {x}, we have that a G ′ (w, x) = a G ′ (w, y). Moreover, since (w, x) = (u, v) and (w, y) = (u, v), we have that a G (w, x) = a G ′ (w, x) and a G (w, y) = a G ′ (w, y). Thus, it holds that a G ′ (w, x) = a G ′ (w, y) =⇒ a G (w, x) = a G (w, y), which entails (w ∼ G x ∧ w ≁ G y) ∨ (w ≁ G x ∧ w ∼ G y)
Since x = u, we have that w ≁ G x, because d G (u, w) > 2, so w ∼ G y. Moreover, since u ∼ G ′ v and a G ′ (v, x) = a G ′ (v, y), then v ∼ G y, which implies d G (w, v) = 2, again a contradiction. This concludes the proof.
According to Theorem 17, when verifying if the addition of an edge (u, v) causes some k-adjacency antiresolving set (with k ≥ 2) of G t to become a 1-adjacency antiresolving set of G ′ t = (V (G t ), E(G t ) ∪ {(u, v)}), it suffices to analyse those sets S ∈ S Gt,ℓ such that some w ∈ S satisfies d Gt (u, w) ≤ 2 or d Gt (v, w) ≤ 2.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have re-visited the notion of (k, ℓ)-anonymity, which quantifies the privacy level of a social graph in the presence of active adversaries. Firstly, we have introduced the notion of (k, ℓ)-anonymous transformations, which allow to reduce the amount of perturbation needed to protect a social graph from an active attack. Secondly, we have critically assessed the assumptions posed by (k, ℓ)-anonymity on the adversary capabilities. Judging that it is unrealistic to assume that an adversary will be able to control all distances between a set of sybil nodes and every other vertex of the social graph, we introduced a new privacy property: (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity, which accounts for adversaries who control the connection patterns with the neighbours of the sybil nodes. Finally, combining the two previous ideas, we have introduced (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations, which are able to protect a social graph from active adversaries levaraging up to ℓ sybil nodes and constructing fingerprints based on the connection patterns between victims and sybil nodes. We proposed two algorithms: one for obtaining (k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transformations for arbitrary values of k, and another for obtaining (2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations for small values of ℓ. The first algorithm is efficient and the number of changes introduced in the graph is bounded. On the other hand, there is still room for improvement in the second method, especially concerning the order in which graph perturbations are applied. We are currently using a greedy heuristic to guide the edge-addition process. We will evaluate the convenience of this heuristic, and explore the use of meta-heuristics such as genetic algorithms and ant-colony optimisation.
